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STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA) 
FOREIGN AID -- 1961 
Mr. President: 
In//J~c-1/;J I e /?"" /e>IJJe 
~_j0; 
He are now on the verge of a final vote on the foreign aid 
program. The bill, in its present form, is substantially that which 
was reported by the Committee. I think it is a good bill il/'hich, if 
it is generally sustained in House, points the way to significant 
improvement in the effectiveness of the aid-program and the saving 
of public funds on this enterprise in the years ahead. 
However, I think we should bear in mind that, with this bill, 
we will have merely paved the way. On other occasions we have 
thought that we had set the course for major improvement only to 
discover later that little had changed. In point of fact, the 
major action we have taken, that is, the new method of long-range 
financing upon which so much of the hope for emendation is based, 
affects directly only a segment of the aid-program. It affects 
only loans to other nations which are repayable to us. I would 
caution, therefore, against expecting very much from the change 
which we have made in this aspect of the program unless there are 
far-reaching changes in other aspects. Of this aid-authorization, 
$1 .2 billion is involved in the Development Loan Fund. The diffi-
culties of the aid-program, in the past, have rarely been associated 
with loans but rather i·Ti th ~ants which form the major part of this 
$4 billion dollar aid-bill--the part which is not repayable, the 
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part for which we shall go on making annual appropriations. The 
basic problems of the aid-program, Mr. President, go much deeper 
than how we may finance lending operations. They go largely to 
the grant aspect of this program. 
I base this observation, Mr. President, on years of parti-
cipation in Committee in hearings on Foreign Aid. I have watched 
old spokesmen for the program go and new spokesmen arrive--
Republicans and Democrats both. I have listened to any ntunber of 
Presidential messages and debates on this subject. I have inquired 
in depth into the program in special and subcommittee study, as one 
Senator trying to do his job. 
As the Senate knows, I have been critical of foreign aid 
for a long time. I remain critical. I remain critical even 
though the legislation this year is sponsored by an administration 
of my own pa=ty. 
I remain critical not because improvement cannot flow from 
the revisions in the Act which have been engineered by the Committee 
on Foreign Relations. I remain critical because the following con-
clusion has become steadily more inescapable over the years: The 
Congress can alter this program drastically or abolish it with a 
meat-ax but no matter how this Act is drawn or redravm, legislation 
can never provide more than a small part of a discriminating answer 
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to the diffic.1ltie s of foreign aid. What matters far more in finding 
that kind of aaswer is how the program is fitted into our foreign 
policies and how effective those policies are in the first place. What 
matters far more is how the aid-program is carried out in the enormous 
detail of administration, day i11 and day out, month in and month out, 
year in and year out. 
In these terms, 1Vir. ~:>resident, there is not yet an assurance 
of a new approach to foreign aid. There is not yet an assurance that 
foreign aid will be shaped to the purposes of foreign policy rather than 
continue as a kind of soporific for our diplomacy. There is not yet 
an assurance that the realistic possibilities of aid will be separated 
from the jumble of illusory expectations and that these possibilities 
alone will be pur sued with vigor and dispatch. There is not yet an 
assura11ce that the complex, costly, cumbersome over-administration 
of the program will be made more effective. 
There is not yet assurance on any of these points for the simple 
reason that perfonnance alone, not words, can provide such assurance • 
.And, at this point in a 11ew administration there can only be the words, 
the promise that changes--essential changes--will be made in foreign 
aid, not the performance itself. That promise, indeed, is to be found 
in the President's message. It is to oe found in the informed efforts 
of the Committee on 2 oreign J::\.elations to give the President the kind of 
legislation which he must have to bring about the essential changes. 
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On the basis of that promise, I inhatal~Ae support fully the 
legislation which the Committee has reported. 
In all frankness, a promise of change, alone, might not have 
been sufficient to persuade me to this position except in present 
circumstances. Does the Senator from Montana support it, then, 
only because he happens to be Majority L eader? Is he under some 
obligation to support it because he is speaking for the Administration 
in the Senate? As the 3enate knows, I have had occasion recently 
to speak not as Majority ;--eader but as a Senator from Montana, on the 
Berlin question. I shoLlld not hesitate to speak again in that same 
capacity on tni s matter or any other, if it seemed to me necessary do 
do so. 
No, Mr. ?resident, I sLtpport this measure not becaLtse I happen 
to be Majority ~eader. I s..1pport it because I believe an aid-program, 
altered in concept and in administration, is vital to the security and 
welfare of the nation. And it should be noted, Mr. President, that the 
word, vital, does not appear very frequently in my remarks i11 the 
Senate. 
If I am prepared to sLtpport this program on the promise of change 
rather than insisting upon the actuality of change, it is because two 
decades of participation have taught me something of the operations 
of this government. E very experienced member of this body knows that 
an orderly alteration in an undertaking of the magnitllde and complex ity 
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of the aid-progra m is not going to be brought abo-.1t in six months 
o r a year. rnat is the case no matter how far- sighted or determined 
may be the political leader ship of this Administration or any other. 
fne simple truth is that the aid-program which was presented 
to -=:ongress this year is not significantly different in substance from 
that of the previous year, despite the change in party shingles on the 
door of the ..:!.. Xec-.1tive Branch. It is different only in its promise of 
change, and. that is the only way in which it can be different at this 
time. The simple truth is that the preponderant detail of this year• s 
program was drawn up last year under the last Ad;.ninistration and by 
essentially the same permanent civil and military officials. 
This simple tr1.1th m-.1st oe noted, Mr. President, not in criticism 
of the previous Administration nor of the incumbent Administration nor 
of the permanent functionaries. This simple truth m1.1st be noted 
beca1.1se we must call the cards honestl y if we are to recast the aid 
program so that it will indeed serve the interests of the nation more 
effectively. 
What this simple truth means is that the previous Administration 
recognized and the pre sent Administration has confirmed, on an initial 
examination of the state of foreign relations, tnat the interests of the 
nation in the world require the aid-program to continue. 
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lv1y own view is that there is a second truth which we need to recognize. 
It is that the aid-program m11st contin1.1e b1.1t in an altered form, as 
collntle ss informed critics- -many in this body- -have noted time arxi 
again. And to these two ooservations, I wo1.1ld add a third: The 
alterations in the aid-program, if they are to safeguard rather than 
disrupt the interests of the nation, can only be promised at this time 
of the new Administration. If they were more than promised, if they 
were changes signed, sealed and delivered at this point, they would 
probably be either insignificant changes or devastating changes. 
Believe me, Mr. President, no member of this oody is more 
convinced than the Senator from Montana- -the Majority L eader- -of 
the need for change in the aid-program. I am not unaware of the high 
content of futility, confusion, inertia, waste and worse which has 
existed in this program for a long time. 
It is understandable that some, seeing these shortcomings, year 
after year, are moved to apply this year, the drastic remedy of 
abolition. On this ground, there will undoubtedly be votes cast 
against final passage of the bill . 
.And there will be others who will see only the expenditure abroad 
of three or four billions of the tax-payers money. They will be moved 
to opposition on this ground, their opposition deepened oy a scattering 
of examples of wasteful or luxurious undertakings in this country or 
that abroad, financed by the aid-program. They will be appalled and, 
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properly so, particularly as they contrast examples of extravagance 
abroad with the oacklog of unfilled needs at home or the deficit in the 
budget. And they, too, will be moved to vote against the oill on final 
passage. 
rhat, of COllrse, is the privilege of every Senator, to vote 
against this oill. 
In all honesty, IV!r. ?resident, I should like nothing more than 
to oe able to tell the citizens of my state and the nation that I had just 
voted to Cllt three or four oillions of spending out of the oudget. ~ven 
more, Mr. President, I should like to be able to tell them that I had 
performed this feat without affecting adversely a single F ederal service 
to any state. 
I co.1ld do that, lvir. President, if I cast a vote against the 
foreign aid bill. It would not be an llntruth. It would oe, rather, a 
fraction of the truth. I would not have told the whole story. I would 
have to add, if I wished to tell the whole story, that I had voted to save 
these three or four Dillion dollars on foreign aid at the gravest risk to 
the security of the nation. I would have to tell them that in voting 
against foreign aid, I had also voted to oring about drastic upheavals 
in South Korea, in South VietNam, in Formosa, in Turkey, in Iran 
and Bolivia and, at least the gravest of political difficulties in Thailand, 
i='akistan, 3pain and Greece and other nations. I wollld have to tell them 
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that I had created a situation whereby there would oe no choice but to 
watch many of these situations collapse or to send United States 
combat forces into them to try to shore them up. 
Nor would that yet oe the whole truth. I should have to add, 
Mr. Pre side.o.t, that I had voted for catastrophic economic disloca.tions 
and famine, disease and pestilence i.o. many free nations and, also, for 
a world-wide financial panic whose effects would be most acutely felt 
in Japan and Western Europe out v.h ose repercussions 'M> uld reach 
even into the United States. 
Finally, I would have to tell the citizens of my state and the 
nation that I had voted to close American military bases in many parts 
of the world and to undermine the whole system of alliances by which, 
for a decade or more, we have sought to defend the security of the nation 
and to keep open the prospects for freedom in peace in large areas of 
the world. 
And after having listed all these consequences of my vote against 
this oill, I would still have to admit that I had not told quite the whole 
story. A postscript would be necessary. I would have to say that I 
acted to bring about these drastic consequences at a time when a new 
Administration was just beginning to grasp the reins of direction over 
the sprawling bureaucracy of this government, at a time when this new 
Administration was confronted with a whole series of ripening inter-
national crises building even at this very moment towards an apex at Berlin. 
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It might be, lVa. President, that I would not wish to burden the 
citizens of the nation with this long and vexatious account of the conse-
quences of my vote against foreign aid. It might be that I would find 
no point in stuffing them with these trouble some facts of international 
life in our times. In that case, Mr. President, I could save their 
time and mine, spare their nerves and mine, if I told them merely 
that I had saved them three or four billion by my vote on foreign aid, 
and then, did my part for the security of the nation by insisting that 
the President use no diplomacy whatsoever but simply stand still at 
Berlin and stop the communists wherever they appeared, whether in 
Laos, South Viet Nam, the Cong:o or PataePnia. 
Exaggeration, Mr. President? I do not think so. Is there 
anyone in this body w .1o does not believe that the most drastic political 
consequences would flow from a sudden cessation of grants of aid to 
Korea, Viet Nam, 3'ormosa, Turkey, Iran, Bolivia, Thailand, Pakistan, 
Spain and Creece? And is the Senate not aware that of the total of 
$3 billion-odd in grants of military and economic assistance, originally 
sought in this legislation by the :bxecutive Branch, $1. 5 billions, was 
earmarked for just these ten nations while the remainder of the grants 
was scattered in relatively small amounts among more than 50 other 
nations? 
I shall not play upon the fears of the Senate by saying that all 
these countries will go to the Communists if we do not pass this measure. 
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The Senate can be assured, however, that in some instances, it is 
no idle fear. What I do say to the .:ienate is that these 10 nations, 
and a few others are the crux of the grant aspect of this program. It 
is these nations which have developed a direct and heavy dependence 
upon American aid. It is these nations which would be affected to 
their very vitals by sudden termination of the program. What I do 
say to the Senate is that the entire position of these nations and their 
relationship with the United States would undergo a sudden and 
incalculable change if this bill were not passed. 
What kind of make- believe world are we living in if we can lead 
ourselves to believe that the situation, at least in the 10 nations I have 
enumerated, would not alter virtually overnight and our relations with 
them turn upside down if we were to withdraw the king-pin of aid? 
And what is a vote against this bill but a vote to withdraw the king-pin? 
Some will see clearly these consequences. .But they will assert 
that it is better to face the collapse of the situations and other world-
wide repercussions rather than to go on with this unsatisfactory device 
of aid and the continued drain on our resources which it entails. 
I respect the honesty of that position, Mr. -=>resident, but I most 
respectfully disagree with it. I disagree with it oecause I do not 
believe this nation can long anchor its life of freedom and plenty in a 
vast sea of hopeless human misery, political chaos and deepening 
tyranny. In the world which we now know, Mr. President, a world 
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rt i still either allied with us, friendl or, 
1 
at worst, indifferent, we are compelled to military expenditures 
6 percent of the budget 
What would that percentage 
be, Mr. President, in a world in which the greater part were allied 
elsewhere, hostile or, at best, indifferent? Eighty percent of the 
budget? 90 percent? How many billions, then, for defense, Mr, President, 
$60 billions? $70 billions? $80 billions? Living day in and day out 
in a military camp, mobilized at constant readiness for an attack 
upon us, how far would we ourselves have moved from freedom? And 
what, then, of the spending in Washington? Spending, not for the 
unemployed or for the aged or for schools or for roads or for the 
countless other human needs of this nation; but spending for the 
dubious privilege of maintaining an uncertain foothold on the edge 
of a hostile world? 
No, Mr. President, I cannot see that the answer to the patent 
shortcomings of the aid-program lies in the drastic surgery of total 
excision. I cannot see it, for I see as the only alternative in pre sent 
international circumstances something approaching a garrison State 
in this nation. If there is any other alternative, it seems to me that 
it is a responsibility on the part of those who advocate this remedy 
to enlighten those of us who do not. 
May I say that I can understand the concern of some Members 
who are persuaded to this solution of abolition of aid. I share the 
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concern without endorsing the solution. And I stress to the Senate 
that there are grounds, enormous grounds for concern in the manner 
in which the aid-program has unfolded in recent years. 
viiho in this body should not feel concern when in country after 
country, after years of this program since the Marshall Plan, grants 
of aid from this nation remain the critical factor in maintaining 
internal stability, and the end of this process is not yet in sight? 
We use words loosely, Mr. President, if we call this condition by 
any name other than a form of dependency. And it is not in the 
interests of this nation or freedom that any other nation remain 
indefinitely in a state of dependency on aid- grants from the United 
States. It is not in the interests of the peoples of the recipient nations. 
Who in this body should not feel concern when hundreds of 
millions of aid goes to governments which have not met or are 
unwilling to meet honest tests of public acceptance in their own 
countries? Who in this body should not feel concern when the gap 
between the luxurious life of the few in and around governments and 
the poverty-striken life of the millions in. aid-receiving nations does 
not begin to close and, all too frequently, the beneficial impact of 
the bulk of our assistance is limited to the few? 
Who in this body should not feel concern at the manner in 
which the military aid program has developed? In theory, military 
aid ought to be bound up directly with our own defense needs. At least, 
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it began that way, Mr. ?resident. It oegan with what seems to me 
to have been a reasonable strategic relationship with free nations 
involved in the defense of the Atlantic region, and with certain key 
countries elsewhere- -a total of perhaps 15 or 20 nations at the 
outside. .Out military aid during the last few years has sprawled into 
al:oi 50 nations and, often, brought in its wake the need for 
massive infusions of economic grants to support military establish-
ments, built and sustained by military aid. It has sprawled in, with 
all the costly trappings of bureaucracy and it has immersed us 
inevitably in the internal affairs of nation after nation whose 
connection with our military defense is often vague or non-existent. 
F rom a concept of close strategic relationship with our defense, 
military aid has now moved to an enlarged base of justification which 
equates the maintenance of internal stability in nations almost every-
where on the globe with our security. That, Mr. President, in my 
opinion, is a most dangerous doctrine, particularly in nations where 
the gross and long- standing neglect of human needs has created 
situations of inevitable and massive internal instability. 
We must ask, Mr. President: Is this intelligent strategy or 
is it simply Parkinson's law with a vengeance? Is any member of 
this body familiar with even one government which, having requested 
military aid, was refused it on the grounds that there was no clear 
connection with our defense? Surely, Mr. President, there must be 
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one nation somewhere in this world which seeks military aid but 
whose relationship to our defense is so re1note that it does not 
warrant the expenditure of millions of dollars of tax-payers' fund 
for equipping its armed forces. 
V!e must ask, Mr. President: Have we underwritten our own 
security by this process? Or have we undermined our security by 
a wholesale and indiscriminate commitment of the prestige and 
resources of this nation in this obscure land or that which may 
come within the eager reach of bureaucracy? 
rhese questions should indeed bring concern in the Senate. 
They give striking cause for concern when we consider them, specifi-
cally, in connection with the situation in Laos. I have some first-
hand familiarity with that situation, Mr. _'=>resident. I was there when 
in 1953 there were only t:wo American officials in the entire country. 
I watched the haphazard whole sale bureaucratic involvement, not of 
one agency but of several, deepen over the years. I urged time and 
again against this course. But the bureaucracy grew and the millions 
of dollars in grants multiplied in 1955, '56, '57, '58, '59 and '60. fhis 
growth helped to tighten the noose around an effective policy. It helped 
to smother the possibility of a sensible diplomacy of limited contact with 
this remote situation by involving this nation ever more deeply in 
Laotian internal affairs. We gave Laotian leaders labels--some 
correct, some incorrect--and then became obsessed with the labels we 
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gave them. And now, seven years later, after the steady flow of 
thousands of civilian and military officials, after the parade of 
private contractors building this or that at millions of dollars of 
cost, after the pilgrimage of inspectors, consultants and what-not, 
more than three-hundred-and-fifty millions of dollars of the tax-
money of the American people later, we are back to diplomacy in 
Geneva in an effort to find a solution to this situation which has 
become far more difficult to deal with than it was when the involvement 
began. 
And should the 3enate not be concerned, Mr. President, by 
the events in Korea? Can we feel anything else but concern when we 
recall the great sacrifices of Americans, Koreans and others to keep 
South 1\:orea free and see now where we have arrived? It is eight years 
after these great human losses culminated in the truce in 1953. It is 
$4 billion dollars in grants after the truce in South Korea. 
What has been wrought by this immense effort, Mr. President? 
We must ask that question. We can no longer sweep the doubts under 
the rug. We cannot take umbrage in shifting the responsibility 
elsewhere. ~~or if there is any area in the world where our influence, 
the influence of the aid-program has been immense and overwhelming 
it has been South Korea during the last 7 or 8 years. 
We know what was achieved by the conflict, Mr. President; 
the hope of freedom was kept alive in South Korea. But what has been 
l 
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done with the years since this achievement? 
What has been wrought, Mr. President, out of the billions 
of aid since the truce? We must ask that question, even though the 
:ommua.ists are poised across the border at the 38th parallel. It 
is no answer to say that in a critical situation of this kind or in 
Laos or in others, the less saj.d the better and then go on in the 
same pattern. VIe cannot accept silence on these burning questions. 
We cannot ignore these matters any longer. 
There are grave risks, Mr. President, in speaking out at a 
time of confrontation with the Gommunists in h.orea no less than 
elsewhere, but the gravest risk of all is to find in this confrontation 
an excuse for not examining and correcting our own shortc01nings. 
Korea has revealed a dangerous pattern into which the aid-
proce sa is interwoven in certain underdeveloped nations. The pattern, 
is this, Mr. President: poverty and want--instability--Communist 
or other pressures-- U. S. aid- -public corruption- -weak civilian 
government--the response of military dictatorship. 
The pattern is stark and clear in Korea but its applicability is 
by no means confined to that buffeted nation. Y. 'e will ignore the 
implications of that pattern only at our own peril, only at great cost 
in wasted aid, only at the risk of repeated blows to the stature, the 
dignity and ultimately the safety of this nation. I say to this Senate, 
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that if the only answer that freedom can give to communism is the 
dead-end vf military J.lnta tnen we have given no answer at all. And 
it borders on the disgraceful to suggest in the land of the Declaration 
of Independence, and the C::onctitution, in a land which fought through 
vVorld vVar II, without doing violence to the rights of its citizens, 
that this is the only answer which can be given. 
For a moment in historic time, the last-ditch device of military 
dictatorship may give a respite from both the threat of communism 
and frustration with the complexities of freedom but the tide of history 
will not wait much longer than that moment. No matter how grim the 
circumstances, we will either divorce ourselves from or change 
this pattern, of which the aid-program has become an interwoven 
element, or we will face the gravest of consequences in the years 
ahead. The answer to communism is responsible freedom and not 
some other form of tyranny in the name of anti- communism or any 
other ism. If we are to use the device of foreign aid at all, we had 
better see to it that those who administer it understand that elementary 
truth. 
Let me make clear, Mr. President, that I do not mean every 
nation receiving aid must reproduce the forms of fTeedom which have 
evolved in this nation or Western Europe. But there are certain funda-
mentals of freedom which cannot be ignored without robbing the word of 
its meaning. There must be the expressed consent of those governed and 
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the right of peaceful dissent. There must be respect and safeguards 
for the dignity of the human personality. Where these do not exist, 
freedom does not exist, and in these situations, the aid-program treads 
on dangerous grounds, particularly in its massive military and economic 
aspects, regardless of how worthy may be its objectives. 
Mr • .?resident, I could go on in this vein, citing case after 
case for concern with the aid-program. I could note this road-project 
or that, crumpling in some obscure country a year or two after millions 
were spent to complete it. I could refer to evidences of unbridled 
incompetence or extravagance, of improper practices, of expensive 
experts piled on expensive experts-- scurrying back and forth and 
producing unused reports flowing in an endless stream to files and 
storage warehouses/ of any number of other specific and expensive 
faults. 
Errors of this kind can be made in foreign aid, Mr. President, 
some excusable, some inexcusable. I daresay that in this respect, 
the agency which administers the aid-program has not been much 
different than a score of others and under far more difficult circurnstances. 
But these errors, Mr. President, do not go to the heart of the matter 
as it confronts the Senate. 
The heart of the matter is that foreign aid cannot be terminated 
abruptly without producing the most catastrophic consequences for this 
nation. And the heart of the matter, too, is that foreign aid must change 
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or, in the end it may still produce catastropnic consequences for 
this nation. 
Time is running out, Mr. President, in which to convert this 
program into a f certain asset for freedom and for the security of 
this nation. 
It seems to me that we shall have a better chance, perhaps a 
last chance, to bring about this conversion if we grasp, now, at the 
beginning of a new Administration, some of the lines of essential 
alteration. Indeed, changes of this nature are suggested in the 
.?resident's message and the Committee's report. If I may summarize 
and elaborate, I would suggest that the revision of this program needs 
be built on these premises: 
(l) Aid Grants--as distinct from loans or Point IV technical 
assistance--ought to be most carefully used as a direct supplement 
of our foreign policies. we must seek constantly, through diplomatic 
initiatives, the adjustment of this nation's role in and relations with 
changing and evolving parts of the world, adjustments which will 
permit a reduction in grants of military and economic aid, without 
jeopardizing peace or security. We must not rest content with any 
existing situation whose stability is heavily dependent on the indefinite 
continuance of this form of assistance from the United States. 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 41, Folder 24, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- 19 -
(Z) Military aid must shrink in orderly fashion until it 
becomes again what it was originally intended to be, a direct arrl 
vital strategic link in the military defense of this nation. Except 
in these terms, it seems to me that this program rests on most 
tenuous grounds. We must, indeed, question whether it is in our 
interests or in the interests of the people of recipient countries if this 
aid serves only vaguely as a link in our defense and very specifically 
as an instrument for promoting internal stability in other lands. 
In short, what I am suggesting, Mr. President, is that we must 
actively discourage, not encourage, other governments from seeking 
or depending upon military aid from this nation. This aid should be 
extended with the greatest reluctance and caution and not with an 
eagerness~plunge this nation into the internal affairs of others. 
I know there is risk in this course. rhis country or that may fall 
to a government which is :::ommunist or otherwise antagonistic towards 
iQ~ 
us. But it ought to be clear by now tha~risk remains even if we do 
supply military aid, as witness Cuba, Viet Nam, and Laos. 
Governments which do not meet the reasonable needs of their 
peoples cannot long endure. If they fall, the consequences to this 
nation, are likely to be far more adverse in those countries which 
have been supplied with significant military aid than in those which have 
not. 
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(3) Vfhere we are deeply immersed in supplying grants of 
economic or supportin g aid of one kind or another, year in and year 
out, we must act to reduce a:1d end this dependen.cy, not in a day, not 
in a year but as rapidly as possible. This is partly the task of 
creative diplomacy, as I have already indicated. But it is also 
the task of a wise, dedicated and indefatigable administration of 
the aid- program itself, with the object of ending the dependency. 
Vfe must develop, together with recipient nations, clear-cut, finate 
and definable objectives for grants of aid. We must insist upon 
sacrifices on the part of those wno can make them in the recipient 
nations, sacrifices which match those of our own people who foot 
the bill for aid. We must develop plans of action which induce an 
ever-increasing imput of initiative and effort on the part of recipients 
and a steady reduction in aid- grants on the part of this¢ nation. 
(4) We must re-examine the present complex of what are the 
small and essentially altruistic expressions of the aid-program, namely, 
our large contributions to the total funds for the United Nations 
technical assistance and related activities, the ..?oint IV Technical 
Assistance Program and the new Peace Corps concept. All of these 
efforts have great merit in themselves but one would hope, Mr. President, 
that we shall make certain that we use to best advantage the tens of 
millions of dollars that flow through these separate channels in terms 
of maximum advantage to the nations into which they flow and, in terms 
l 
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of long-range goodwill. If there is one part of the aid-program which 
should act to kindle warm, iluman, friendly contact between the 
people of this nation and people elsewhere, it is this type of activity. 
(5) In our own interests as well as in the interestsof peace we 
must encourage and welcome the widest possible international 
participation in assisting 11nderdeveloped nations to move forward 
more rapidly in economic and social progress , We are trying to do 
that, of course, with respect to Western Europe. But there is room 
for more giving in some of the nations of that region. Indeed there 
is room for more giving on the part of nations everywhere. 
In this connection, it sho11ld be noted that there was a time, 
not very long ago, when the mere prospect of 3oviet assistance to 
non-communist countries was viewed as little short of disastrous on the 
part of those who administered our own aid-affairs. The Congress was 
spurred to appropriations for the aid-program on the grounds that we 
had to compete with the Russians in this process. Yet the Russians 
have given aid to India. They have given aid to Egypt and elswhere 
and the world has not collapsed in any of these places. Indeed, there 
seems to be even a measure of correlation between the presence of Soviet 
aid-administrators in, and the improvement of our relations with, 
certain nations in A sia and Africa. 
It seems to me utterly essential that the people of this nation not 
be pressured into larger appropriations for the aid-program by this 
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tactic. The tactic not only undoes much of the intrinsic worth of 
the program by giving it a motivation which is transparent even to 
children, out it places this nation in the position of being presured 
into ever larger grants of aid. 
We must do what :must be done in foreign aid, not on the basis 
of a competition with the Soviet Union to see who can get there first 
with the most wide-open hand. We must do what must be done on the 
basis of what reasonably serves the interests of the people of this 
nation and the people of recipient nations, what serves freedom and 
peace . Other nations must act as they see fit. If they believe it 
really serves their interests to accept Soviet aid and they get it, I see 
no cause for panic on our part. 
These observations would seem to oe so elementary as not to 
require discussion in the 3enate. Yet, it is evident that much that is 
elementary needs discussing if this program is to be improved. 
(6) Finally, Mr. President, grants of military and economic 
aid, partic'llarly, must be administered as instruments of foreign 
relations on the basis of policies determined first and last by the 
.t?re sident and the Secretary of State. Jur diplomacy must be free to, 
and must be spurred to seek to redu.ce the need for this aid. It must 
cease to serve as a kind of spearhead or errand boy for the introduction 
of this type of assistance into more and more nations. 
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Within the administrative structure of the aid program itself 
there must be a complete overhaul of concepts, techniques, and, if 
necessary, of personnel in order to make certain that the program 
does become a controlled instrument of policy in fact as well as in 
words. And, finally, if aid is to be an effective instrument, there 
must be a vast simplification and streamlining of the administrative 
processes themselves. 
Mr. ?resident, in my opinion, changes along these basic lines 
must be achieved and they must be achieved promptly. ·.Jur security 
is at stake. ·.Jur stature as a responsible and prudent nation is at 
stake. Prevention of the waste of enormous amounts of public funds 
is at stake. 
Some may inquire, then, why should the 3enate n~~t~ow to 
save more of these funds by cutting the authorization reported by 
the ::::ommittee? And indeed, why should the Senate n~i;froceedi'j 
on the Floor to write into law these basic changes which I have been 
discus sing? 
I revert to what I said at the outset of my remarks. I am 
satisfied, Mr. President, t~h1£he Foreign Relations ;;ommittee 
has done with this bill constitutes what can be prudently and wisely 
done by legislative action at this time, I would not hesitate to accept 
the combined judgment of that group of men against any other, including 
the past or pre sent administrators of this program, as to what 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 41, Folder 24, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- 24 -
legislation will be most useful. Their year-in, year-out consideration 
of this measure has given them an understanding and knowledge of ai<YJ,r"""-
~ which is unexcelled in this body or in this governrne nt. 
The balance of the task of alteration, as I see it, Mr. President, 
must be carried out by the President and the Administration. With 
a new President and a new Administration, the opportunity for con-
structive change does exist. The president is prepared and determined 
to do the job that must be done. It is essential that he have every 
reasonable opportunity to do it. If Senators-- regardless of party--
de sire that this program be altered, as, clearly, it must be altered, if 
Senators de sire that significant amounts of public funds be saved in 
the years ahead, v.i thout jeopardy to the nation's security and interests, 
they will support this bill. ~t ha:s ee-tna.ge a fnnn peJ;Aali!! ... J 
Mr. President, I have spoken, today, at great length and with 
the utmost frankness. I hope that in doing so I have not given personal 
offense to anyone in the Senate, the Administration or in friendly nations 
abroad. Certainly that was not my intention. But there comes a time, 
Mr. President, when it is necessary to risk misunderstanding in order 
to further a greater understanding, when facing facts must take precedent 
over saving face. That time, I believe, is now, for the foreign aid 
program. 
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